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Abstract
This paper distinguishes several different approaches to organising a weakest pre-condition (WP)
calculus in a theorem prover. The implementation of two of these approaches for Java within the
LOOP project is described. This involves the WP-infrastructures in the higher order logic of the
theorem prover PVS, together with associated rules and strategies for automatically proving JML
specifications for Java implementations. The soundness of all WP-rules has been proven on the basis
of the underlying Java semantics. These WP-calculi are integrated with the existing Hoare logic,
and together form a verification toolkit in PVS: typically one uses Hoare logic rules to break a large
verification task up into smaller parts that can be handled automatically by one of the WP-strategies.
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1. Introduction
The LOOP project [29] works on theorem prover based reasoning about sequential Java
programs. It uses the interface specification language JML [20,21] to formulate the cor-
rectness properties that are to be verified. Typically they consist of class invariants and
method specifications. They are written as special comments in the Java code. Within the
LOOP project a special compiler (also known as the LOOP tool [2]) is used to translate
Java programs together with their specifications into the language of a back-end theorem
prover (usually PVS [26]): JML specifications become predicates, which have to be proved
interactively for (translated) Java implementations.
The current situation is that the basic verification technology is there, and has proven
itself in several case studies [3,5,16,18]. Most of the efforts are now invested into:
• incorporating more and more sophisticated aspects (such as model variables) of the
specification language JML into the translation;
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• scaling the proof technology to larger examples, primarily by reducing the user-
interaction that is required, e.g. by developing powerful program logics and associated
proof strategies.
This paper contributes to this second point by describing several weakest pre-condition cal-
culi for Java with JML. It takes a “proof engineering” perspective, focusing on performance
and scalability in tool-assisted handling of non-trivial verification tasks.
As is well-known [7,12], in a weakest pre-condition (WP) calculus there are rules for
computing for a given program s and post-condition Q a pre-condition P = wp(s,Q) for
which the Hoare triple {P }s{Q} holds. Moreover, this P is the weakest predicate for which
this triple holds, as expressed by the familiar equivalence:
{R}s{Q} iff R ⇒ wp(s,Q). (1)
The most famous rules are for assignment, and composition:
wp(x = e,Q) = Q[e/x] wp(s1; s2,Q) = wp(s1, wp(s2,Q)). (2)
The challenge when extending this approach to Java is that there are far more complicated
language constructs in Java than are usually considered in WP-calculi, such as exceptions
and expressions with side-effects. Another challenge appears when one wishes to incor-
porate such a WP-calculus in a theorem prover—as was first done by Gordon [9]. For
complicated languages such as Java and JML, much effort goes into proof engineering:
organising the material in such a way that automatic verification of non-trivial examples
becomes computationally feasible. Therefore it is important to keep the size and number
of proof goals under control.
When it comes to WP-calculi with theorem prover support we distinguish two different
setups.
WP as function inside the logic. The prime example of this approach is [14]. It gives
a deep embedding of a simple while language with expressions having side-effects, and
of an associated assertion language, into the language of the theorem prover HOL [10].
The embedding is called ‘deep’ because the syntactic units of the programming and as-
sertion languages are represented in the theorem prover, namely as inhabitants of suitable
inductive data types. In contrast, in a ‘shallow’ embedding the syntax of the language is
not represented in the logic, but its terms are directly translated into functions acting on a
suitable semantic domain in the theorem prover.
Since the embedding of [14] is deep, the WP calculations are performed by an actual
function in HOL, of the form:
wp : Command × Assert → Assert × list[Assert].
For a command s and post-condition Q, the result wp(s,Q) = (P, ) yields a pre-condition
P together with a list  of verification conditions. The main result of [14], itself proven in
HOL, is that the (combined) assertions in  imply {P }s{Q}. The type Command is an
inductive type—since this is a deep embedding—on which the function wp can be defined
by induction.
The LOOP project uses a shallow embedding of Java in PVS. Hence an inductive defi-
nition of an internal WP function as above is impossible. But an impredicative1 definition
can be used, of the form:
wp(s,Q) def= λx · ∃P · P(x) ∧ {P }s{Q}. (3)
1 This definition is called ‘impredicative’ because it defines a predicate by quantifying over all predicates,
including itself.
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This defines wp(s,Q) as the union of all predicates P with {P }s{Q}. The familiar equa-
tions, like in (2) above, can then be proved for this definition. We shall elaborate on this
approach—adapted to Java—in Section 5.
WP as function outside the logic. In the second approach the WP calculations are done
outside the theorem prover, and only the generated verification conditions are fed into the
prover. This approach is followed for instance in [13] for Ada. More recently, it is used
for Java in projects like Jive [25,27,30] or Krakatoa [23], in [4], and also in the ESC/Java
static checker [8,31], but not in this paper.
Within the LOOP project a Hoare logic for JML has already been developed [19]. It
works well, but requires much user-interaction, because intermediate predicates (e.g. for
the composition rule) have to given by hand. One of the main design goals of our WP-
calculi is that they integrate smoothly with the existing Hoare logic. This allows us to use
the WP-calculi within a Hoare logic proof, for instance to complete the proof of a certain
branch, or to step from one intermediate assertion to a next one. Such integration of Hoare
logic and weakest pre-condition reasoning is also advocated in [30]. Thus, the starting
point for our WP-calculi is given by the n-tuples of predicates used in the Hoare logic for
JML of [19]. It will be reviewed in Section 4 below.
It turns out that there are several options for a WP-calculus, not from a logical per-
spective, but from a proof engineering point of view (within a theorem prover). For
instance, one can use the WP-rules in forward or backward style. Various options are
described in Section 3 below. We have implemented in PVS two of these approaches,
the so-called Nested-Forward-External (NFE) one and the Flat-Backward-Internal (FBI)
one. NFE is basically the classical WP-calculus, adapted to Java and JML, whereas FBI
can be seen as a specialised variation. The calculi NFE and FBI will be described in
Sections 5 and 6, respectively. As will be explained, FBI can handle more constructs,
but NFE is faster and can handle larger amounts of code, see Section 7. Both these WP-
calculi result in new PVS commands, called (NFE-ASSERT) and (FBI-ASSERT), which
together with the existing Hoare logic form the main ingredients of our verification tool-
set.
Related work
WP-calculi for Java have been used most prominently within the Extended Static
Checker for Java (ESC/Java [31]) and within the Jive [25,27,30] and Krakatoa [23] tools.
There are substantial differences with these approaches––apart from the already mentioned
difference of having a WP-function inside or outside the theorem prover.
• ESC/Java is a static checker, using a back-end theorem prover that is invisible to the
user. The checker works very fast for assertions of limited complexity. It is neither sound
nor complete, but it can trap surprisingly many program errors—such as null-pointer
or array bound violations. In contrast, within the LOOP project, arbitrarily complex
assertions can be verified, but this requires (substantial) user-interaction.
• ESC/Java works by translating Java into an intermediate guarded command language
[8,22], for which a WP-calculus is used in the dedicated theorem prover. Again, how
this works is invisible to the user. There are thus no explicit WP-rules for Java.
The approach we follow here is thus closer to the one used in the Jive and Krakatoa
tools. However, there are still differences.
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• The Jive/Krakatoa WP-rules act on the abstract syntax of Java program, and not on their
translation into a theorem prover.
• The Jive/Krakatoa tool works as a verification condition generator, spitting out proof
obligations for a back-end theorem prover—which have to be handled separately. These
proof obligations only involve the assertion language, and contain no program con-
structs.
• The soundness of the program logic rules that are applied by the Jive/Krakatoa tool has
to be established in a separate mathematical analysis.
In our approach we stay within one system (namely PVS), and use special rewrite rules
in PVS both for decomposing the program and for handling the resulting verifications.
Thus, the soundness of the rules can be proven within PVS.
Organisation of the paper
Below, the exposition starts with a non-trivial verification example from the context of
Java-based smart cards [6]. It is put first to give the reader an impression of the scale issues
we are dealing with. Subsequently, the paper focuses on WP-calculi. It first describes in
general terms the various options one has when implementing a WP-calculus. From then
on it focuses on the setting of the LOOP project. In Section 4 the paper recalls the basics
of the representation of Java statements and expressions in higher order logic, and the
associated Hoare logic with n-ary tuples. Then, Section 5 explains the NFE-calculus with
its higher-order definition of a WP-function and with its properties. Section 6 continues
with the FBI-calculus that incorporates a different approach. Its infrastructure turns out to
be more complicated. A comparison between NFE and FBI is given in Section 7. Finally,
Section 8 wraps up with some concluding remarks.
It is assumed that the reader is already reasonably familiar with the setting in which we
are working. In particular, nodding acquaintance with JML [20,21] and the (coalgebraic)
semantics and Hoare logic [19] used within the LOOP project is helpful. In our presentation
we stay reasonably close to the actual implementations in PVS, and we do not try to give a
purely logical calculus. After all, our original motivation is to get a runnable WP-calculus
within a theorem prover. Inevitably, some issues and details only make sense to readers
with actual experience in prooftool-based program verification.
2. A phone card example
Currently the main application area of our verification work is Java Card-based smart
cards. This involves JML specification and verification of both the API [3,24,28] and
of smart card applets [5]. In this section we consider a very simple phone card applet
which keeps track of a certain byte balance for enabling phone calls. In the example
we use an upperbound of 128 for the balance. It should be possible to set the balance
field initially, but not any more once the card has been issued. This means the applet
needs another field issued of type bool which is initially set to false and set to true
as soon as the balance field is given its initial value. This represents a rudimentary life
cycle model. At any moment it should be possible to consult the current value of the
balance field. Decreasing this balance field is only allowed when the card has been
issued.
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The main safety properties of the example are expressed in JML as a class invariant and
constraint:
/*@ invariant
@ 0 <= balance && balance < 128;
@*/
/*@ constraint
@ \old(issued) ==> (balance <= \old(balance) && issued);
@*/
Clearly, the invariant describes the bounds for the balance. The constraint basically says
that once the card has been issued, the balance can only decrease and the card remains is-
sued. This property is expressed as a relation between the pre-state (indicated by \old) and
the post-state. The invariant is implicitly added to all pre- and post-conditions of methods;
similarly, the constraint is added only to post-conditions. These safety properties are clear
and concise. An applet developer may want to show such properties to the customer. And
probably, such a developer first wants to make sure that these properties actually hold. This
where our work becomes relevant.
Smart cards are instructed to perform certain operations through so-called APDUs (for
Application Protocol Data Units), which are structured byte sequences containing both
instructions and data (following ISO specification 7816-4 (see [6, Chapter 8])). These byte
sequences are exchanged between a terminal (as client) and a card (as server). Within a Java
Card applet a special process method is responsible for managing the incoming command
APDUs once the applet is selected. Every command APDU contains an instruction byte
which is examined by the process method. Whenever an I/O error occurs with such an
APDU, a corresponding APDUException arises. This is a runtime exception.
The process method of a Java Card implementation of the simple phone card applet
is given in Fig. 1, together with its JML specification. The latter contains a keywords
requires for the method’s pre-condition, ensures for the post-condition in case of normal
termination, signals for the post-condition in case of abrupt termination (caused by an
exception), and modifiable for the items that may be changed by this method.
Special instruction bytes for the three relevant commands are chosen (as static fi-
nal) and abbreviated as INS_SETBAL, INS_DECBAL, and INS_GETBAL respectively. They are
used to steer the proper control flow in the switch statement. Note that the card is rendered
useless once the value of balance reaches zero. That is, the process method first checks
if balance is zero and simply throws an exception without even examining the incoming
APDU object. Exceptions of type ISOException thrown by a Java Card applet show up on
the terminal side as special return codes in the response APDU. Notice how an appropriate
mask 0x7F ensures that the balance is set below 128 (as required in the invariant).
The key properties of this application are expressed in the invariant and constraint, so
that the ensures clause in Fig. 1 is trivial. Additionally, the first signals clause guarantees
that if an ISOException is thrown, this happens because (a) the card was already issued
(in the pre-state) and either its original balance was non-positive or an instruction to set the
balance was given, or because (b) the card was not issued and the instruction to decrease
the balance appeared. In both those cases the fields issued and balance remain as before.
Finally, the second signals clause specifies that when a (runtime) APDUException occurs,
both the issued and balance fields remain unchanged.
It is not our aim to explain the precise meaning of every aspect of the process method,
but rather to give the reader an impression of the sort of verification challenges that are
66 B. Jacobs / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 58 (2004) 61–88
Fig. 1. Java code plus JML annotation for the process method of a phone card applet.
relevant in this setting. In particular, we note that the process method involves various
alternatives (via if and switch), array operations, bitlevel and cast operations, and method
invocations (some of which are static). During verification, the specifications of these
methods are used (but they are not shown here).
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Fig. 2. Expanded proof tree of the NFE-WP proof for the process method from Fig. 1.
The correctness of the JML specification in Fig. 1 can be proven automatically in PVS
using our NFE-WP approach (see Section 5), requiring basically no user-interaction (apart
from starting a few preparatory commands). This comes close to push-button technology,
like in ESC/Java. The whole verification takes about half an hour, on a 2 GHz Pentium.
Fig. 2 describes the structure of the expanded proof tree in which each applied WP-rule
appears as a separate node. As one can see, the rules lead to 28 subgoals (or branches),
each corresponding to a separate path through the program.
Our second WP implementation, called FBI (see Section 6), is unable to handle this
process verification. It crashes after running for more than a day. This is not a logical
problem, but one that has to do with computation resources. The crash happens because
within the FBI approach, proof obligations are collected and saved until the end, eventu-
ally leading to proof goals that are too large for the theorem prover. This illustrates the
importance of proper proof engineering. It is the topic with which we continue.
3. Options for a WP-calculus in a theorem prover
This section will illustrate three different options from which to choose when one wishes
to implement a WP-calculus in a theorem prover. These options are highly relevant for the
ultimate performance. But from a logical perspective, they are essentially the same.
Forward versus backward reasoning. Recall the equation wp(s1; s2,Q) = wp(s1,
wp(s2,Q)) for composition from (2). After such a step one can decide to continue with
the first or the second wp(si,−) on the right-hand-side of the equation. In the forward
approach one first computes wp(s1,−), and in the backward approach one first evaluates
wp(s2,−). The latter seems to be most common, but there is nothing in the rules that
prevents us from reasoning in a forward style. In a sense it is even more intuitive, because
it follows the flow of control.
For instance, in forward style one computes:
wp(x = e; s,Q) = wp(s,Q)[e/x]
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One then leaves the substitution [e/x] as it is, and continues calculating wp(s,Q) under
the substitution. In our PVS implementation, the substitution corresponds to a function
application, so this is unproblematic.
In a theorem prover one can leave this choice between forward or backward to the
(rewriting strategy of the) theorem prover. However, one can also—as we do—write a
dedicated strategy that chooses a particular approach.
Nested versus flat WP-applications. In the right-hand-side wp(s1, wp(s2,Q)) of the com-
position rule in (2) one sees nested applications of the WP-function. Now suppose we want
to reason backwards. For large programs, repeated application of this composition rule
leads to large, complicated proof goals of the form wp(s1, wp(s2, . . . wp(sn,Q))). These
are difficult to manage. An optimisation is to flatten these nested applications and develop
a slightly different WP-calculus with only one WP-application. An obvious way to realise
this is to work with lists of statements, like in wp(〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉,Q) instead of with a
single statement. This is what we call the flat approach, as opposed to the standard nested
approach.
This flat approach is thus designed to calculate backwards. There is no composition rule:
instead, the idea is to decompose the last statement sn to atomic form, so that its effect can
immediately be incorporated in the post-condition.
(Actually, as we shall see in Section 6, for a language like Java with side-effects in ex-
pressions, these lists need to contain not only statements but also expressions. This makes
the infrastructure a bit more complicated.)
External versus internal pre-conditions. As we see in (1), in order to prove a Ho-
are formula {P }s{Q}, we have to prove an implication P ⇒ wp(s,Q). Thus, the pre-
condition P is external to the WP-formula. This is completely standard. In a theorem
prover one replaces the implication by a turnstile: P  wp(s,Q), so that the pre-condi-
tion P = P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pn may be simplified separately, once and for all. This gives huge
performance gains, because in larger applications this P may easily be flattened to more
than 100 separate assumptions. They can all be written to normal form once, and loaded as
auto-rewrites, so that there is no repetition of work in each subsequent proof branch.
However, for certain rules, especially for while and for loops, it is not convenient to
have the pre-condition external. Typically, these rules involve a suitable invariant predicate
(together with a decreasing variant function), that must be inserted in the subsequent WP-
calculations. Often, such an invariant is only a minor variation or addition to the existing
pre-condition. But once the pre-condition has been fully decomposed before the turnstile,
it is not easy to get it back into the WP-function. Therefore, it makes sense to carry the
pre-condition along in the WP-calculations, as in WP(P, s,Q). This is what we call the
internal approach. Essentially, it amounts to calculating with Hoare triples. It does not have
the above mentioned performance gains in the external approach.
Within the LOOP projects two WP-calculi have been implemented, involving three
times a different option: there are rules and strategies for the NFE approach (see Sec-
tion 5), and for the FBI approach (see Section 6). The NFE approach works with or-
dinary WP-applications wp(s,Q), but the FBI approach uses the non-standard format
wp((, P ), 〈s1, . . . , sn〉,Q).
Why (only) these two? First of all it must be noted that implementing such a WP-
calculus for the whole of sequential Java is a non-trivial effort, taking a couple of months’
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work. The WP-rules for each calculus involve roughly 100 K of handwritten PVS code,
and all have to be proved separately. Furthermore, appropriate associated PVS-strategies
have to be written (in LISP), and evaluated on many examples. Finally, although other
combinations are possible, the implemented versions NFE and FBI seem to make good
sense.
Before we can describe these two WP-calculi NFE and FBI in more detail, we first need
to explain a bit more about the semantic setting of the LOOP project.
4. Java statements and expressions, and their Hoare logic
We start by explaining the basic framework in which we are working. Concretely, it
exists in the form of PVS theories, but here we shall present it in more general type theoretic
terms with labeled product [ lab1 : σ1, . . . , labn : σn] and coproduct {lab1 : σ1| · · · | labn :
σn} types, in a hopefully self-explanatory notation.
A key ingredient of the Java semantics as used within the LOOP project is the type OM,
for object memory, with its various get- and put-operations (see [1]). Java statements and
expressions are translated as functions OM → StatResult and OM → ExprResult[α], for
a suitable output type α. These result types are defined as labeled coproduct (also called
variant or sum) types:
StatResult : TYPE def= ExprResult[α] : TYPE def=
{ hang : unit { hang : unit
| norm : OM | norm : [ns : OM, res : α]
| abnorm : StatAbn } | abnorm : ExprAbn }
with labels hang, norm and abnorm corresponding to the three termination modes in Java:
non-termination, normal termination and abrupt termination. Notice that a normally termi-
nating expression returns both a state (incorporating the possible side-effect) and a result
value. This is indicated by a labeled product (record) type [ns : OM, res : α]. The types
StatAbn and ExprAbn for abrupt termination are subdivided differently for statements and
expressions:
StatAbn : TYPE def=
{ excp : [es : OM, ex : RefType ]
| rtrn : OM ExprAbn : TYPE def=
| break : [bs : OM, blab : lift[string] ] [ es : OM, ex : RefType ]
| cont : [cs : OM, clab : lift[string]] }
The type RefType is used for references, containing either the null-reference or a pointer to
a memory location. It describes the reference to an exception object, in case an exception is
thrown. The lift type constructor adds a bottom element bot to an arbitrary type, and keeps
all original elements a as up a. It is used because break and continue statements in Java
can be used both with and without label (represented as string).
On the basis of this representation of statements and expressions all language constructs
from (sequential) Java are formalised in type theory (and used in the translation performed
by the LOOP tool) (see for instance [15,16]).
Also, the various termination options for Java statements and expressions are incorpo-
rated in the special, extended Hoare tuples for JML, as described in [19]. They are used to
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translate JML specifications to PVS, and thus have analogous structure. We recall the main
definitions. First there are the labeled product types of these Hoare tuples:
StatBehaviorSpec : TYPE def=
[ diverges : OM → boolean, ExprBehaviorSpec[α] : TYPE def=
requires : OM → boolean, [ diverges : OM → boolean,
statement : OM → StatResult, requires : OM → boolean,
ensures : OM → boolean, expression : OM → ExprResult[α],
signals : OM → RefType → boolean, ensures : OM → α → boolean,
return : OM → boolean, signals : OM → RefType
break : OM → lift[string] → boolean, → boolean ]
continue : OM → lift[string] → boolean ]
For Hoare tuple terms sbs : StatBehaviorSpec and ebs : ExprBehaviorSpec[α] in these types
the meaning is given by functions SB and EB as described in Fig. 3. Thus, an ordinary
(partial) Hoare triple in our setting becomes:
{P }s{Q} = SB ·


diverges = λx. true,
requires = P,
statement = s,
ensures = Q,
signals = λx. λe. true,
return = λx. true,
break = λx. λ. true,
continue = λx. λ. true


This says that if the pre-condition P holds, and if the statement s terminates normally, then
the post-condition Q holds. Notice that in case all the above true’s were changed to false’s,
then this says that s must terminate normally (and in that case Q must hold), giving us a
Fig. 3. The interpretation of Hoare tuples for statements and expressions.
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total Hoare triple. In general, these n-tuples conveniently allow us to be very expressive in
our program logic, following the structure of method specifications in JML.2
A final point: post-conditions in JML are really relations instead of predicates. They
involve two state variables, namely one for the pre-state and one for the post-state. This pre-
state variable is used in the semantics of \old(-). It is not made explicit above, but is han-
dled via a so-called logical variable—as shown later on in (5). It is not crucial at this stage.
5. A Nested-Forward-External weakest pre-condition calculus
This section describes the first of our WP-calculi for Java, namely the one which is
closest to a standard WP-calculus. It starts with an exploration of the appropriate post-
conditions for Java statements and expressions. Then it gives the higher order definition
of the WP-functions—one for Java statements and one for Java expressions—satisfying
the analogues of (1). For this definition, the standard properties of the WP-function can be
proved. This will be illustrated for several language constructs.
In the previous section we have seen the labeled product types StatBehaviorSpec and
ExprBehaviorSpec containing appropriate entries for reasoning about JML specifications.
Here we extract the entries that are relevant as post-condition in the following types.
StatPostSpec : TYPE def=
[ diverges : OM → boolean, ExprPostSpec[α] : TYPE def=
ensures : OM → boolean, [ diverges : OM → boolean,
signals : OM → RefType → boolean, ensures : OM → α → boolean,
return : OM → boolean, signals : OM → RefType
break : OM → lift[string] → boolean, → boolean ]
continue : OM → lift[string] → boolean ]
Our WP-functions for Java statements s and expressions e will then be defined as functions:
wps · s · sps, wpe · e · eps : OM −→ boolean
where sps : StatPostSpec and eps : ExprPostSpec. These functions wps and wpe compute
pre-condition predicates of type OM → boolean. In PVS we simply use the overloaded
notation wp for both functions, but here we shall use explicit subscripts for statements and
expressions.
[As an aside: what is non-standard about our post-conditions with multiple predicates
of types StatPostSpec and ExprPostSpec is the combination of different predicates for
the different output modes in Java. In principle, one can use standard post-conditions and
combine all possible outputs into one single mode by using special, auxiliary variables, but
in this way one loses clarity. Furthermore, with this single mode, the composition rule (2)
becomes (as in [30]):
wp(s1; s2,Q) = wp(s1, (e /= null ∧ Q) ∨ (e = null ∧ wp(s2,Q)))
where e is the special auxiliary variable for exceptions, which is non-null when an ex-
ception is thrown. In principle, there should also be such a variable for return, break and
continue abnormalities. This means that in every composition step the proof goal grows
2 Actually, the n-tuples in our Hoare logic closely correspond to the different termination options that are
distinguished in our “coalgebraic” representation of statements and expressions, via the result types StatResult
and ExprResult. Thus, our program logic follows the structure of our program semantics.
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considerably in size (untill it becomes clear what this e actually is). This may become a
real problem. It is avoided by keeping the different output modes in the logic.]
The higher-order, impredicative definition of our WP-functions, in analogy with (3), are
given in Fig. 4. As a direct consequence of these definitions, the analogues of the defining
equivalence (1) hold. For statements this means the following.

SB · ( diverges = d,
requires = p,
statement = s,
ensures = q,
signals = r,
return = R,
break = B,
continue = C )


iff


∀x : OM. p · x ⇒
wps · s · ( diverges = d,
ensures = q,
signals = r,
return = R,
break = B,
continue = C ) · x


(4)
There is a similar result for expressions. These rules are used to move from a Hoare style
proof to a WP-proof. Also, when the wps and wpe functions have done their work, the
implication on the right-hand-side is what remains to be proved. This is automatically done
in PVS via a special command called (SEMANTIC-ASSERT). It is a powerful command that
involves many dedicated strategies for dealing with the typical patterns that occur in JML’s
assertions (such as modifiable clauses). Sometimes, (SEMANTIC-ASSERT) cannot complete
a (complicated) proof goal, and additional user-interaction is needed. An example is shown
later on, in the proof (on the left-hand-side) in Fig. 6, where a manual instantiation is
needed to complete the proof.
What is not entirely trivial is that the appropriate properties of WP-functions, like
in (2), can actually be proved for our impredicatively defined functions wps and wpe. In
contrast, in the setting of [14], with a deep embedding of the language, such properties
hold by (inductive) definition. These derivable results exist in our setting for Java’s
Fig. 4. The higher-order definitions of the WP-functions for statements and expressions.
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try-catch (-finally), switch, while, for, new, array access/assignment, method calls etc. For
instance, the rule for composition takes the following form,
wps · (s1; s2) · sps = wps · s1 ·
(
sps WITH ensures := wps · s2 · sps
)
where WITH is the obvious record update operation. This rule requires that the predicate
sps.diverges is constant (i.e. of the form λy : OM. a for a boolean a, which is either true
or false).3 The associated PVS-strategy that we choose to use for this WP-calculus is the
forward one, continuing with wps · s1 after rewriting with this composition rule.
Similarly, for the (translation into PVS of Java’s) return statement RETURN = λx :
OM.abnorm(rtrn x) : OM → StatResult there is the associated equation
wps · RETURN · sps = (sps.return)
Java’s conditional conjunction operation && forms an interesting example. Recall that it
only evaluates its second argument if the first one evaluates to true. One therefore expects
a rule of the following form (using a constant predicate in the diverges clause).
wpe · (e1&&e2) ·


diverges = λy. a
ensures = q,
signals = r

 · x
= wpe · e1 ·


diverges = λy. a
ensures = λy. λb.¬b ⇒ q · y · false,
signals = r

 · x
∧
wpe · e1 ·


diverges = λy. a
ensures = λy. λb. b ⇒ wpe · e2 ·


diverges = λy. a
ensures = q,
signals = r

 · y,
signals = r


· x
This rule has a conjunction as right-hand-side, and leads to two subsequent proof goals:
one in which e1 evaluates to false, and one in which e1 evaluates to true. Only this second
case involves a nested WP-application for e2.
This rule for && is sound w.r.t. our underlying semantics (like all our other rules).
However, it has a defect: it requires that e1 is evaluated twice. Therefore it is better (from
a proof-engineering perspective) to use the following improved version.4
wpe · (e1&&e2) ·


diverges = λy. a
ensures = q,
signals = r


= wpe · e1 ·


diverges = λy. a
ensures = λy. λb.¬b ⇒ q · y · false
∧
b ⇒ wpe · e2 ·


diverges = λy. a
ensures = q,
signals = r

 · y,
signals = r


3 In most examples the diverges predicate is indeed constant. But there is also a special bureaucratic rule
within our calculus which turns a correctness formula with an arbitrary (non-constant) diverges predicate into
two formulas with constant diverges predicates: one true and one false.
4 Due to Joachim van den Berg.
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We briefly discuss the soundness proof for this second &&-rule. For the direction (⇒), the
definition of wpe gives a predicate pre with pre · x and
EB · ( diverges = λy. a,
requires = pre,
expression = e1&&e2,
ensures = q,
signals = r )
as in Fig. 4. The two outer wpe function on the right-hand-side of the above &&-rule
unfolds to an existential quantification. We can instantiate it with the given predicate pre.
The interesting case is when e1 evaluates normally to a pair (ns = y, res = true) with result
true and successor state y. In that case the second, nested wpe unfolds to another existential
quantification. It can be instantiated with the predicate λz.z = y. For the direction (⇐),
assume the nested wpe-formula on the right-hand-side. Its outer existential quantifier gives
rise to a pre-condition that can be used for instantiation on the left-hand-side. It does the
job.
This WP-calculus also includes a rule for method invocation. Actually, there are two
rules, one for void methods (statements) and one for non-void methods (expressions).
They follow the standard formulation of [12, Chapter 12]. For instance, assume a non-void
method m without parameters, with the following specification.
∀z : OM.EB · ( diverges = d,
requires = λx.p′ · x ∧ z = x,
expression = m,
ensures = q ′ · z,
signals = r ′ · z )
(5)
Note that this specification contains a “logical” variable z to capture the pre-state. As al-
ready mentioned, this is needed because JML’s post-conditions may involve expressions
like \old(-) that require evaluation in the pre-state (see Fig. 1). Therefore, these post-
conditions are really relations. In this case, where we have a non-void method m, say with
result of type α, the type of the normal post-condition q ′ is OM → OM → α → boolean.
Similarly, the exceptional post-condition r ′ has type OM → OM → RefType → boolean,
where RefType is the type of references, which is used here for references to exception
objects.
The associated WP-rule for a call to this method m is:
p′ · x ∀y. ∀a. q ′ · x · y · a ⇒ q · w · y · a ∀y. ∀e. r ′ · x · y · e ⇒ r · w · y · e
wpe · m ·


diverges = d
ensures = q · w,
signals = r · w

 · x
It is applied in upward direction, and thus leads to three subsequent subgoals. From a
proof-engineering perspective we note that the first subgoal p′ · x for m’s pre-condition
is usually easy to prove. The two other subgoals consist of quantified implications, whose
assumptions about q ′ and r ′ can be moved before the turnstile , so that they can be decom-
posed, written to normal form, and installed as auto-rewrites. It is very efficient to do this
immediately. The conclusions of these implications (q and r) are typically WP-formulas
themselves, with which the computations continue, in the present forward style.
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Finally, we like to remark that, when applied to a while statement, we can prove that
our WP-function wps is equal to an existential formula, analogously to what is used
as definition in [12, (11.2)]. There is also an associated, standard result using an invari-
ant predicate and variant function for a while statement, but it has not been put to good
(automatic) use yet in the “external” implementation—as explained in Section 3. This
is not a logical problem but a proof-engineering one. It is currently a limitation of the
NFE-approach.
6. A Flat-Backward-Internal weakest pre-condition calculus
This section describes our second WP-calculus, working with assertions of the form
wp(P, s,Q) with sequences s of statements si and with internal pre-condition P , as ex-
plained in Section 3. It turns out that the infrastructure for this FBI-calculus is much more
involved than for NFE in the previous section. It will occupy us for much of this section.
But we should stress that this complicated infrastructure is of no concern to the user, be-
cause it is hidden, and the user only applies one high-level PVS-command (FBI-ASSERT).
This will be illustrated in an example verification at the end (see Section 6.9).
Before diving into the technicalities, we shall try to convey the main idea, using an
informal notation. Suppose we have a sequence of statements whose last command is an
assignment x = 2 + e, for some (structured) expression e. The FBI-WP-rules work in such
a situation as follows.
wp (P, 〈s1, . . . , sn, x = 2 + e〉,Q)
= wp (P, 〈s1, . . . , sn, 2 + e i〉,Q[i/x]
)
where 2 + e i means that 2 + e evaluates to i
= wp (P, 〈s1, . . . , sn, e i1, 2 i2〉,Q[i/x][i1 + i2/i]
)
= wp (P, 〈s1, . . . , sn, e i1〉,Q[i/x][2 + i2/i]
)
= wp (P, 〈s1, . . . , sn, e i1〉,Q[2 + i2/x]
)
etc.
Notice how the last entry in the list turns from a statement (the assignment) into an ex-
pression (on the left-hand-side of), which is decomposed in the course of the FBI-rule
applications.
This “flat” WP-calculus—with a single WP-function working on lists—is thus based on
the idea of writing the last statement (or expression) in the list to atomic form, so that its
effect can be incorporated in the post-condition. This simple idea works well until the last
item in the list is a catch statement (for exceptions, returns, breaks or continues). In that
case one has to be careful to distinguish between abnormalities arising in the preceding
list and those arising in the body of the catch statement (which might have to be caught).
We shall make this distinction by creating what we call a detour. This is what makes the
infrastructure of our flat WP-calculus complicated.
6.1. Combining statements and expressions
As illustrated above, our FBI-calculus for Java involves lists of both statements and ex-
pressions. This requires a supertype in which both statement and expression results can be
injected. This type, called WPResult, involves four type variables, ε, ρ, β, γ for the various
possible outcomes for abnormal termination. This abstraction is somewhat mysterious at
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this stage, but will become clear later in Section 6.8 to realise the required “detour” for
abnormalities.
WPResult[ε, ρ, β, γ ] : TYPE def=
{ hang : OM
| norm : [ns : OM, rs : boolean]
| excp : [es : OM, ex : ε]
| rtrn : [rs : OM, rr : ρ]
| brk : [bs : OM, blab : β]
| cont : [cs : OM, clab : γ ] }
Notice that the normal case always has an output, of type boolean. We shall combine
statements and expressions into functions of a single type OM → WPResult with a com-
mon codomain. This happens via functions checkstat and checkexpr, which have certain
“translation functions” as parameters.
te : RefType → ε, tr : unit → ρ, tb : lift[string] → β, tc : lift[string] → γ 
checkstat · te · tr · tb · tc : (OM → StatResult) → (OM → WPResult) def=
λs.λx. CASES s · x OF {
hang → hang x
| norm y → norm (ns = y, res = true)
| abnorm a →
CASES a OF{
excp e → excp (es = e.es, ex = te · (e.ex))
| rtrn z → rtrn (rs = z, tr · ∗)
| break b → brk (bs = b.bs, blab = tb · (b.blab))
| cont c → cont (cs = c.cs, clab = tc · (c.clab)) } }
Here we use unit as the singleton type with sole inhabitant ∗. Notice how true is inserted as
(irrelevant) output in the normal case. In the abnormal cases the translation functions are
used to map the outcomes to the appropriate parameter types ε, ρ, β, γ .
There is a similar function for expressions. It requires only one translation function, but
it does have an extra argument to capture the result of the expression, if any.
te : RefType → ε, r : α 
checkexpr · te · r : (OM → ExprResult[α]) → (OM → WPResult) def=
λe. λx. CASES e · x OF {
hang → hangx
| norm y → norm (ns = y.ns, res = (r = y.res))
| abnorm a → CASES a OF {
excp e → excp (es = e.es, ex = te · (e.ex)) } }
Notice how an equation is used as (boolean) output in the normal case. It binds the result
of the expression to the parameter r . At the same time, the side-effect of the expression, if
any, is passed on.
6.2. Hoare tuples with lists
In Section 3 we have mentioned that the WP-functions wp(p, s, q) that we are now
formalising are in fact special Hoare tuples. Indeed, they can be seen as combination of
the types StatBehaviorSpec and ExprBehaviorSpec of Hoare tuples from the beginning of
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Section 4. This combination will be called StatExprBehaviorSpec; it will work on lists5 of
functions of type OM → WPResult, with label ses for “statement-expression-stack”:
StatExprBehaviorSpec[ε, ρ, β, γ ] : TYPE def=
[ diverges : OM → boolean,
requires : OM → boolean,
ses : list[OM → WPResult[ε, ρ, β, γ ]],
ensures : OM → boolean,
signals : OM → ε → boolean,
return : OM → ρ → boolean,
break : OM → β → boolean,
continue : OM → γ → boolean ]
The meaning of such WP-tuples seb : StatExprBehaviorSpec is given below. It describes
that for all states x : OM satisfying the pre-condition, the appropriate post-condition holds
after evaluation of the list of statements and expressions, starting in x. This evaluation is
done by a special function WPevallist which will be defined subsequently.
seb : StatExprBehaviorSpec  SEB · seb : boolean def=
∀x ∈ OM. seb.requires · x ⇒
LET w = WPevallist · (seb.ses)·
(assump = true, kind = norm · (ns = x, res = true))
IN w.assump ⇒ CASES w.kind OF {
hang y → seb.diverges · y
| norm y → seb.ensures · (y.ns)
| excp y → seb.signals · (y.es) · (y.ex)
| rtrn y → seb.return · (y.rs) · (y.rr)
| brk y → seb.break · (y.bs) · (y.blab)
| cont y → seb.continue · (y.cs) · (y.clab) } }
The function WPevallist thus acts on a list of functions OM → WPResult. It yields an en-
dofunction not on OM, but on an extension of it, which we call WPState. This type records
an additional assumption, obtained from the Boolean result in the type WPResult.
WPState : TYPE def=
[ assump : boolean, kind : WPResult]
Thus, for a list  : list[OM → WPResult], the term WPevallist ·  yields a function WPState
→ WPState. It is defined via a list-map, using a function WPeval which acts on a single
operation OM → WPResult.
 WPeval : (OM → WPResult) → (WPState → WPState) def=
λf. λw. CASES w.kind OF {
normy → CASES f · (y.ns) OF {
norm y → ( assump = y.res ∧ w.assump,
kind = w.kind)
| z → ( assump = w.assump,
kind = z) }
| _ → w }
5 In principle one could also try to define an appropriate composition operation on functions of type OM →
WPResult, but that idea has not been followed.
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Thus, WPeval · f does nothing on an element w : WPState whose kind is non-normal. But
if its kind is normal, then f is evaluated on the enclosed normal state. The kind of this
evaluation then appears in the result. In the special case where f terminates normally, the
Boolean result is added to the assumption. It is at this point that the equation in the normal
result of a checkexpr is added to the assumptions.
Finally, we see that the assump field in a WPState collects all the boolean results of
the statements and expressions that are evaluated. For statements this has no effect because
their result is simply true (after translation to WPResult). But for an expression e evaluating
to a value i, this fact is recorded in assump. These collected assumptions are used as left-
hand-side of the final implication in the above definition of SEB, describing the meaning
of an FBI-formula wp(p, s, q). Informally, it says that the pre-condition p, togheter with
all these recorded assumptions obtained from evaluation of the (expressions in the) list s
should imply the post-condition q.
6.3. How FBI-rules work
In this section we describe in detail the FBI-WP-rule for an integer-addition expression
in Java, as already discussed informally at the beginning of this section. The rule uses the
operation ; as “snoc”: it adds an element at the end of a list. It is used in FBI-rules because
of the backward reasoning. The rule for + takes the following form.
∀i1, i2. SEB · ( diverges = λx. a,
requires = p,
ses = ; checkexpr · te · i1 · e1; checkexpr · te · i2 · e2,
ensures = λx. i = i1 + i2 ⇒ q · x,
signals = r,
return = R,
break = B,
continue = C )
SEB · ( diverges = λx. a,
requires = p,
ses = ; checkexpr · te · i · (e1 + e2),
ensures = q,
signals = r,
return = R,
break = B,
continue = C )
Notice that we use a double line to express that this rule is valid in both direction. But
we are only interested in using it upwards. The way to read this direction is as follows.
Suppose we have a stack of statements and expressions whose last element is an addition
expression e1 + e2, as below the lines. In order to prove that this expression evaluates to
i, we have to first evaluate e1 to i1 and e2 to i2, and then assume that i = i1 + i2. Since
FBI-calculations are done backwards, the existing stack  is extended with two elements,
namely the checks checkexpr · te · i1 · e1 and checkexpr · te · i2 · e2. The Java evaluation
strategy for an expressions like e1 + e2 is from left-to-right [11, 15.7]. Therefore, in the
backwards calculation we continue with checkexpr · te · i2 · e2, as above the line.
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In automatic rewriting in PVS a proof goal as below the line in this rule (the conclusion)
is replaced by the goal above the line (the assumption). In this way the length of the stack
increases, but the complexity of the last expression is reduced. At the same time, the normal
post-condition (the ensures clause) may change. In general, during a WP-calculation, the
stack continuously increases and decreases in length, but eventually it becomes empty. This
is the point where the final implication: pre-condition implies adapted post-condition has
to be proved, see Section 6.5 below.
The above WP-rule for + is rather long, and only a small part of it is relevant. Further, the
checkexpr (and checkstat) functions do not contribute to the readability. Therefore we shall
omit the irrelevant parts from the specifications, and simply write (like in the beginning of
this section):
e i for checkexpr · te · i · e and s for checkstat · te · tr · tb · tc · s.
whenever there is no confusion. In this way the above rule for addition becomes:
∀i1, i2. SEB · ( · · · ses = ; (e1 i1); (e2 i2),
ensures = λx. i = i1 + i2 ⇒ q · x, · · · )
SEB · ( · · · ses = ; ((e1 + e2) i),
ensures = q, · · · )
For instance, the rule for if-then-else looks as follows. It involves the expected split in two
subgoals (above the lines).
SEB · (· · · ses = ; (c true); s1, · · ·) SEB · (· · · ses = ; (c false); s2, · · ·)
SEB · (· · · ses = ; IF-THEN-ELSE · c · s1 · s2, · · ·)
It says that when the last statement is an IF-THEN-ELSE, then one should continue (up-
wards) with two proof goals: one in which the condition c is true with s1 as last statement,
and one in which c is false and with s2 as last statement.
Similarly, the rule for conditional and && is as follows.
SEB · ( · · · ses = ; e1 true; SEB · ( · · · ses = ; e1 false,
e2 a, ensures = λx. ¬a ⇒ q · x,
ensures = q, · · · ) · · · )
SEB · ( · · · ses = ; ((e1 && e2) a),
ensures = q, · · · )
Like in the NFE-version of the rule for && in the previous section, the distinction must
be made whether the first argument e1 evaluates to true or to false. What is different in
the FBI-rule is that this first argument must be evaluated twice. This is caused by the
backward strategy used with FBI, in which one has to start from the second argument e2,
if e1 evaluates to true. But whether this is the case or not, is not known yet at the stage
where one has to decide whether to evaluate e2 or not. Therefore, both possibilities have to
be taken into account, as in the above rule.
Space restrictions prevent us from describing all the FBI-rules. Therefore we have to
make a selection. In the remainder of this section we concentrate on some special rules, for
starting and stopping, for atomic expressions, and for (catch-)breaks. The final Section 6.9
briefly describes a verification example involving a while loop.
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6.4. Start rules
In the beginning of this paper we explained that it is one of our design goals that our
WP-calculi be usable within a Hoare proof. In (4) we have already seen how to proceed
from a Hoare tuple (a StatBehaviorSpec or ExprBehaviorSpec) to an NFE-proof (with
wps or wpe). Below we give the rules to move from a Hoare proof to an FBI-proof (a
StatExprBehaviorSpec). This is done via singleton sequences.
SEB · ( · · · ses = checkstat · id · id · id · id · s,
return = λx : OM. λu : unit. R · x, · · ·)
SB · ( · · · statement = s,
return = R, · · · )
The symbols id are used for the identity function. The change in the return label is purely
bureaucratic to make the types match.
∀a : α. SEB · ( · · · ses = checkexpr · id · a · e,
ensures = λx : OM. q · x · a
return = λx : OM. λu : unit. false,
break = λx : OM. λ : lift[string]. false,
continue = λx : OM. λ : lift[string]. false )
SB · (· · · expression = e,
ensures = q, · · · )
Thus, individual statements and expressions in Hoare tuples are translated into singleton
stacks in FBI-tuples. The associated translation functions are simply identities. For expres-
sions, the redundant labels return, break and continue are filled with constantly false predi-
cates. After application of these initial rules, the structural FBI-rules take over in a WP proof.
As a special case, the composition of statements in Java is turned into list composition.
6.5. Stop rule
A proof branch ends when the list of statements/expressions is exhausted through ap-
plication of the FBI-rules. There is then one thing left to do: prove that the pre-condition
implies the (adapted) post-condition:
∀x : OM.p · x ⇒ q · x
SB · ( · · · requires = p,
ses = (),
ensures = q, · · · )
After this rule PVS automatically starts the command(SEMANTIC-ASSERT) to prove the quan-
tified implication above the lines. As mentioned in Section 5, this same command is also used
when the NFE-functions wps and wpe have done their work. Notice that only after application
of the above stop rule, is the implicit pre-condition p in the FBI-approach decomposed and
rewritten. This happens over and over again, at the end of each proof branch.
6.6. Atom rules
So far we have not seen FBI-rules that actually decrease the list of statements and ex-
pressions. Such rules apply when the right-most item of the list is of atomic form. There are
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a few such rules, like for skip, and for BREAK and BREAK-LABEL in the next subsection.
Here we shall consider the cases of constant and field expressions.
For an element a of type α, there is a corresponding constant expression const · a :
OM → ExprResult[α], given by λx : OM.norm(ns = x, res = a). The corresponding FBI-
rule is as follows.
SEB · ( · · · ses = ,
ensures = λx. (b = a) ⇒ q · x, · · ·)
SEB · ( · · · ses = ; (const · a b),
ensures = q, · · · )
Similarly, for a “field” f : OM → α there is a corresponding expression F2E · f : OM →
ExprResult[α], defined as λx : OM.norm(ns = x, res = f · x). Its FBI-rule is like for const
above, with an upper ensures clause: λx : OM.(b = f · x) ⇒ q · x.
6.7. Method invocation rules
Assume a specifaction for an expression method m as described earlier in (5). It gives
rise to the following FBI-rule for method invocation.
SEB · ( · · · ses = ,
ensures = λx. p′ · x∧
∀y. q ′ · x · y · a ⇒ q · y
∧ ∀e. r ′ · x · y · e ⇒ r · y · (te · e),
signals = r, · · · )
SEB · ( · · · ses = ; (checkexpr · te · m · a),
ensures = q,
signals = r, · · · )
Basically, this rule involves the same obligations as we have seen for NFE in the previous
section. But this time they are all accumulated in the post-condition of the single new proof
goal above the line.
6.8. Break rules
One of the most salient features of Java is its exceptions mechanism. Within our FBI
framework there are appropriate rules for dealing with try-catch and try-catch-finally, based
on the semantics described in [17]. These WP-rules are fairly complicated. Therefore we
shall describe the rules for breaks. They are similar to, but more elementary than the rules
for exceptions.
We recall that the break statement can occur in Java with and without label (or string).
Therefore, in our semantics in PVS, we have two corresponding functions given as
follows.
 BREAK : OM → StatResult def=
λx : OM. break(bs = x, blab = bot)
str : string  BREAK-LABEL · str : OM → StatResult def=
λx : OM. break(bs = x, blab = up str)
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The function CATCH-BREAK is used to translate labeled statements lab:s in Java, namely
as [[lab : s]] = CATCH-BREAK · (uplab) · [[s]]. This function performs what is laid down
in the following quote from the Java Language Specification [11, 14.7].
A labeled statement is executed by executing the immediately contained Statement. If
the statement is labeled by an Identifier and the contained Statement completes abruptly
because of a break with the same Identifier, then the labeled statement completes nor-
mally. In all other cases of abrupt completion of the Statement, the labeled statement
completes abruptly for the same reason.
This prescription is formalised as follows.
ll : lift[string], s : OM → StatResult 
CATCH-BREAK · ll · s : OM → StatResult def=
λx : OM. CASES s · x OF {
abnorm a → CASES a OF {
break b → IF b.blab = ll
THEN norm(b.bs)
ELSE abnorm(break b)
ENDIF
| w → abnorm(w) }
| z → z }
It thus transforms a break abnormality with appropriate label into a normal termination.
The FBI-WP-rules for BREAK and BREAK-LABEL are not very surprising. They move
the predicate at the break slot to the ensures slot, with appropriate label:
SEB · ( · · · ses = ,
ensures = λx.B · x · (tb · bot), · · · )
SEB · ( · · · ses = ; BREAK,
break = B, · · · )
SEB · ( · · · ses = ,
ensures = λx. B · x · (tb · (upstr)), · · · )
SEB · ( · · · ses = ; (BREAK-LABEL · str),
break = B, · · · )
The rule for CATCH-BREAK is more complicated. The first thought is to do the reverse
exchange: from ensures to break. However, the problem is that in our “flat” setup we do
not deal with a single CATCH-BREAK statement, but with a stack of the form ; (CATCH-
BREAK· · ·)—corresponding to a composition s; (CATCH-BREAK· · ·). In this situation the
statement s can in principle also create a break-abnormality, which should not be caught
by the subsequent CATCH-BREAK. Our solution is to provide a detour for such a break-
abnormality thrown by s. It is applied automatically by PVS. It is implemented by changing
the type of these break-abnormalities, from β to the disjoint union β + β = {inl : β|inr : β}.
In this way the break-abnormalities from s can go into the left component of β + β, and
the ones that have to be caught into the right one. This leads to the following rule.
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SEB · ( · · · ses = (transfun · id · id · inl · id · );
(checkstat · te · tr · (inr ◦ tb) · tc · s),
ensures = q,
break = λx : OM. λc : { inl : β | inr : β }
CASES c OF{
inl b → B · x · b
| inr b → IF b = tb · ll
THEN q · x
ELSE B · x · b ENDIF }, · · · )
SEB · ( · · · ses = ; checkstat · te · tr · tb · tc · (CATCH-BREAK · ll · s),
ensures = q,
break = B, · · · )
The soundness of this rule requires that the function tb be injective. This will always
be the case. The function transfun does the translation between the abnormality outputs.
In the rule above it is used on a list. It is obtained by iteration from the following function
acting on a single item.
f e : ε1 → ε2, f r : ρ1 → ρ2, f b : β1 → β2, f c : γ1 → γ2 
transfun · f e · f r · fb · fc : (OM → WPResult[ε1, ρ1, β1, γ1])
→ (OM → WPResult[ε2, ρ2, β2, γ2]) def=
λf. λx. CASES(f · x). kind OF {
hangy → hangy
| normy → normy
| excpy → excp (es = y.es, ex = fe · (y.ex))
| rtrny → rtrn (rs = y.rs, rr = fr · (y.rr))
| brky → brk (bs = y.bs, blab = fb · (y.blab))
| conty → cont (cs = y.cs, clab = fc · (y.clab)) }
There is an associated WP-rule which removes these transfun functions:
SEB · (· · · ses = ,
break = λx : OM.λb : β.B · x · (inl · b), · · ·)
SEB · (· · · ses = transfun · id · id · inl · id · ,
break = B, · · ·)
In a similar way the other abnormalities are treated in the FBI framework.
6.9. FBI-verification example
In this final subsection we briefly discuss another example verification, this time using
FBI-rules. The Java and JML code is given in Fig. 5. The aim of the method find in this
figure is to find a (non-negative) value v in an integer array ia, all of whose elements
should be non-negative. The search is performed by a while loop (with a condition ahaving
a side-effect) and starts at the end of the array. There are three cases:
• The value v is found in ia, say at position i, and i is returned by the method.
• This v is not found, and -1 is returned.
• A negative element in the array ia is detected, causing the search loop to be interrupted
in a special manner, via a labeled break statement. In that case -2 is returned.
(Recall that an unlabeled break within a loop interrupts the loop and passes control
to the subsequent statement, and that a labeled break passes control to end of the
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Fig. 5. Java code plus JML annotation for the FBI-verification.
encompassing labeled block. Indeed, in the PVS translation of this method there are two
CATCH-BREAK statements involved: one surrounding the loop, and one surrounding the
labeled block.)
These three cases are captured in the method’s specification in Fig. 5. The WP-verifica-
tion requires an explicitly given loop invariant and variant. The latter is a function from the
state space to the natural numbers which decreases with every cycle. The JML keywords
for invariant are maintaining and for variant decreasing.
The FBI verification is again almost fully automatic: only one branch remains to be
solved by the user, namely the one in which the existential quantifier \exists in the third
option of the ensures clause in Fig. 5 needs to be instantiated. But all the complicated
control flow in this example, incorporated in the detour mechanisms described in the
previous subsections, is handled automatically. Fig. 6 presents the proof tree in two forms:
B. Jacobs / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 58 (2004) 61–88 85
Fig. 6. Prooftrees for the FBI correctness proof for Fig. 5: in the tree on the right the (fbi-assert) command
on the left is expanded.
the form on the left describes the required user interactions, consisting of only four com-
mands that have to be given to PVS. The proof tree on the right gives the expanded version
of the one on the left, in which all the rules applied by the (FBI-ASSERT) command are
made explicit. The FBI-WP-rule for the while command is clearly recognisable as the one
giving rise to three subgoals: one for establishing the invariant before the loop, one for
establishing the post-condition after the loop, and one for establishing that the repetition
statement maintains the invariant and decreases the variant. This is standard. But it can be
applied automatically in this FBI setting because we have ‘internal’ pre-conditions.
7. Comparison between NFE and FBI
The two WP-calculi described in this paper are in use for almost a year now, in several
verification case studies. The resulting experience is briefly summarised in this section.
In small verification examples there is not much difference in performance between
NFE and FBI. However, in general, the NFE-approach is faster and able to handle larger
verification challenges at once (like the phone card example in Section 2). The reason for
this difference in performance is a more efficient handling of both pre- and post-conditions
within the NFE-approach, and a better handling of conditionals in forward reasoning. We
briefly discuss these matters.
• In the NFE-approach pre-conditions are handled externally to the WP-function (before
the turnstile ) so that they can be rewritten to normal form early on, and used to simplify
subsequent proof goals. Clearly, this does not happen for FBI, where pre-conditions
remain an argument of the non-standard WP-function.
• During the application of FBI-rules, post-conditions inside WP-applications may grow
considerably in complexity. The method invocation rule from Section 6.7 is good
example. Such post-conditions continue to grow until the leafs in proof trees, i.e. until
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the stop rule from Section 6.5 can be applied. This may lead to unmanagably large proof
goals (for the back-end theorem prover). In contrast, the NFE-rules quickly break up the
goal into smaller parts, that can be optimised along the way. For instance, with the NFE-
method invocation rule discussed at the end of Section 5, two of the three new proof
goals above the line (the ones with q ′ and r ′) lead to additional assumptions before the
turnstile (namely these q ′ and r ′) which can immediately be used for simplification.
• The most salient difference between the abovementioned NFE- and FBI-rules for &&
is that the first argument has to be evaluated twice in FBI, and only once in NFE. There
is a similar difference for the conditional statements if-then and if-then-else, and
conditional expression ?:, in which the boolean condition has to be evaluated twice in
FBI and once in NFE. This contributes to the better performance of the NFE-approach.
There is also an aspect in which the FBI works better than NFE. The FBI-approach can
automatically handle loop (in)variants, as we have seen in the example in Section 6.9. Also
in the NFE setting the correctness of this while loop can be proved, but only by manually
instantiating the invariant together with an appropriate part of the external pre-condition.
Currently, we have no strategy for doing this without user interaction. Hence, briefly, FBI
can handle more constructs, but NFE is faster and can handle larger amounts of code.
8. Concluding remarks
This paper describes new verification techniques within the LOOP project based on
two different realisations of a weakest pre-condition calculus, called NFE for Nested-
Forward-External, and FBI, for Flat-Backward-Internal. They form a non-trivial exten-
sion of classical work, involving appropriate WP-rules for all the language constructs of
sequential Java. Concretely, the paper contributes two new PVS commands (NFE-ASSERT)
and (FBI-ASSERT) for proving (translated) JML specifications for Java implementations.
Together with the existing Hoare logic they form a powerful toolkit for proving non-trivial
correctness assertions with minimal user-interaction. As crucial differences we have seen
that NFE is more efficient, but that FBI can handle loops automatically.
With this toolkit, program verification becomes a bit like model checking: when (NFE-
ASSERT) or (FBI-ASSERT) completes a proof (branch) it is great, but when not, one is left
with a long trace that is hard to interpret for debugging. Also, there are clear performance
issues: sometimes PVS can run for hours without completing the proof, or it can crash
because it grows too big. Hence the most effective approach for larger programs seems
an appropriate combination of Hoare logic for breaking up the proof goal, and weakest
pre-condition reasoning for finishing the resulting smaller subgoals. JML provides the key-
word assert for putting intermediate assertions within method bodies, which can be used
for breaking up the proof goals with the composition rule from Hoare logic. Hence an
integration of Hoare logic and WP-reasoning is essential in larger verifications.
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